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Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining 
 
Abstract 
The double aim of this paper is to investigate the link between firm training behaviour and the 
adoption of performance-related pay (PRP) and to verify how the quality of management 
contributes to explaining the strength of this link. Using Ordinary Least Squares Estimates and 
Fixed Effect Estimates for a sample of Italian firms, we find that training is a significant 
determinant of firm level bargaining on PRP. Furthermore, we find that managerial quality plays a 
significant positive role and suggest that this is because managerial quality favours the evolution of 
social norms based on wage bonuses that enhance trust, sustain collaborative relationships and 
motivate co-workers to train each other. 
 
Jel Classifications: M53; M52; J50; I20 
Keywords: Training; Compensation; Management; Education 
 
Introduction 
Intangible assets, such as human capital and organisational changes, are important sources of 
labour productivity growth and a significant part of the entire stock of knowledge is built up by 
skills and experiences acquired from vocational and on-the-job training (EU Commission, 2014). In 
this context, flexibility in internal labour markets and personnel management practices oriented to 
encourage the upgrading of employees’ skills are strategical aims. However, many more steps 
targeting this issue should be implemented as human capital does not readily adjust to the changing 
demands of labour. As revealed by the Eurofound survey, only half of the surveyed workers believe 
that their skills correspond well with the tasks they perform in the workplace, and more than ten 
percent of the workers report a need for more training (Eurofound, 2012, p. 9; EU Commission, 
2014, p. 37). 
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Theory argues that management practices that may stimulate investments in firm specific 
training may be limitedly implemented because these investments have no market value and these 
specific skills are intrinsically difficult to contract upon. Even for training that is technically 
general, imperfections in the labour market may de facto cause that training to be firm specific 
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999). Contract incompleteness implies a moral hazard problem because 
the non-investor party may opportunistically appropriate part of the returns without sharing the 
initial cost sustained by the other party. When the investor party does not receive the full marginal 
return on his investment, he will under-invest as shown in the survey of Leuven (2005). 
                                                          
1
 The Eurofound survey indicates that across all sectors and all EU Member States, only 55% of the surveyed 
workers felt that their skills corresponded well with their tasks, 13% of the workers reported needing more 
training and 32% said they had the skills to cope with more demanding duties (Eurofound, 2012, p.9). 
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However, economic theory has determined that training provided at the company level may 
encourage workers and firms to bargain over the expected returns of firm-specific skills 
accumulation (Hashimoto and Yu, 1980, Hashimoto, 1981). Thus, incentives, such as pay schemes 
linked to company performance, may mitigate the threat of opportunistic behaviour (Green and 
Heywood, 2011).  
Managerial ability should be at the core of this issue as it takes significant time to build skills, 
and only an entrepreneur who visualises long-term targets as well as short-terms goals would be 
willing to invest sufficient effort into developing skills and talent throughout the organisation and 
adopt the appropriate bargaining strategies to pursue this strategic aim. For instance, firms invest 
the socially optimal amount if they are able to sufficiently motivate workers by reciprocity ( Leuven 
(2005). Furthermore, because employees allocate effort to on-the-job training by helping co-
workers, a managerial design that provides incentives to help in multi-agent situations (Itoh, 1991) 
could motivate co-workers to provide training (Green and Heywood, 2011). These designs, 
however, require firm organisations that tend to focus on “people management” (Bloom, Sadun, and 
Van Reenen, J. 2010).  
Thus far, only limited empirical research has investigated these claims by testing whether the 
quality of management plays some role in explaining the propensity of firms to share the benefits of 
investments in human capital accumulation with their workforce (Bloom et al. 2014). The 
contribution of this paper is to investigate the link between firm training behaviour and firms’ 
bargaining strategies and to verify how the quality of management may contribute to explaining the 
strength of this link. For our empirical analysis, we use detailed representative firm-level data on 
approximately 4000 Italian firms for the years 2007 and 2010, and we first examine whether 
training has played a role in explaining firm level bargaining (FLB) and its components, i.e., 
performance-related pay (PRP) and labour organisations (LO). Second, we verify whether the role 
of training is greater in firms characterised by high-quality management.  
On the basis of our rich data set, which contains a wide set of information about employment 
composition and firm characteristics  and performing fixed effect estimates, we control for both 
observed and unobserved factors that may obscure and distort inferences of the relationship among 
training, management quality and firm bargaining.  
This paper is organised as follows: section 2 offers a brief discussion of the related literature; 
section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics; section 4 illustrates the econometric strategy 
and estimation results; section 5 concludes. 
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2. Related literature 
Previous studies focused on training have examined whether providing a profit sharing scheme 
reduces turnover and, through this indirect channel, increases the optimal levels of skill acquisition 
(Azfar and Danninger, 2001). Other contributions have empirically analysed whether profit sharing 
also plays a direct role by creating a contract that rewards training and/or encourages co-workers to 
provide training (Green and Heywood, 2011, Itoh, 1991). In a similar vein, Gielen (2011) examined 
whether profit sharing increases incentives for employees to more efficiently apply their skills and, 
in turn, stimulate employers to invest more in training.  
We reconsider these issues from a different perspective and explore the determinants not of 
training intensity but of bargaining intensity, with the main aim to verify the role of skill 
accumulation as a determinant of bargaining on labour organisations and, more specifically, on 
contingent rewards such as performance-related pay.  
As theory presents different rationales to explain agreements at the company level on wage 
bonuses, it is relevant to identify the specific role that investments in human capital may play in 
conditioning the probability of the adoption of these agreements. Accordingly, some broad lines of 
research are considered. 
First, the payment of wage bonuses may act as an incentive to promote efficiency in the 
production process. As such, these bonuses may help manage the asymmetric information and 
moral hazard problems that influence training programmes and cause suboptimal levels of 
investments in human capital. We summarise the main arguments from the on-the-job literature 
according to Leuven (2005).  
In a competitive setting, workers finance the general training they receive by, for example, 
accepting lower wages during the training period. This is because they could leave after training and 
find alternative jobs where they could be paid a wage that is equal to their marginal productivity. 
Thus, they receive a full return and have the incentive to finance their training when they are not 
liquidity constrained. However, workers may fear a hold-up problem from their current employer if 
it is costly to find alternative employment and if the range of their outside options is limited 
(Leuven, 2005; Green and Heywood, 2011, p.626). 
On the contrary, some firms finance specific on-the-job training that is useful only to the firm, 
i.e., it is not valuable outside their firm. However, if, after training, the worker and the firm 
separate, the investment in training is lost (Becker, 1962). To address these problems, the worker 
and the firm may maximise the joint surplus by setting the wage in such a way that it balances the 
cost of inefficient quits vs. the cost of inefficient layoffs (Hashimoto and Yu, 1980). By paying a 
high wage, the firm reduces workers’ voluntary quits and wage schemes such as profit sharing, that 
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reduce separation, also play an indirect role in encouraging training, as found by Azfar and 
Danninger (2001). 
Under imperfect competition, training that is technologically general is de facto equivalent to 
firm specific training because wages are below marginal productivity, and thus, the firm may reap 
benefits from providing training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999). In this case, the employer has 
control over the worker's time, and he may pay a low wage with a promise of training (Acemoglu 
and Pischke, 1999). Accordingly, some relevant labour market imperfections are crucial factors for 
understanding why firms pay for general training. As stated by the authors, when wages are below 
the marginal product, the equilibrium wage structure is compressed, and firms bear some of the cost 
of training, even when workers can also invest in skills. 
However, under contract incompleteness, training duties involve intangible activities that cannot 
be clearly specified and cannot be easily verified by courts. In such circumstances, difficulties in 
monitoring the firm's compliance make it possible for the employer to renege on his training 
promises, thus resulting in suboptimal training in firm-specific skills. Though this problem could be 
solved by a reputation mechanism, this mechanism is highly imperfect because training within the 
firm is difficult to observe by outsiders (Katz and Ziderman, 1990). As determined by the authors, a 
training firm under asymmetric information is more informed than the market as potential recruiters 
do not know the specific training a prospective employee has received from previous employers. 
Thus, the consequence is that the recruiter assigns a lower expected value to a recruited worker with 
general training than does the firm that trained him. This tends to lower the employee’s outside 
options and reduce his bargaining power on wage.  
Firms are also constrained from investing in training when they fear that the employee will quit 
after training (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1997) or they believe the employee will not efficiently 
execute the newly learned skills. In this context, schemes, such as efficiency wages (Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1986), especially when worker effort to accumulate firm specific skills cannot be easily 
monitored, reduce opportunities for trained employees to perform sub-optimally and reduce 
suboptimal investments in human capital. Furthermore, collective bonuses that reward not only 
individual effort but also team cooperation may encourage co-workers to provide on-the-job 
training to new hires. (Itoh, 1991; Green and Heywood, 2011). 
Offering wage schemes that link employees remuneration to firm‐level performance commonly 
involves the distribution of rents. These forms of financial participation give employees a residual 
claim over part of the firm’s surplus, for example, in the form of profit‐ and gain‐sharing (see the 
overview of Boeri et al. 2013). As previously stated, training provided at the company level 
encourages workers and firms to bargain over the expected returns of firm-specific skills 
5 
 
accumulation (Hashimoto, 1981). Indeed, “by writing a contract in which it is specified that 
workers get a certain percentage of profits, workers can feel more confident that they will not be 
held up ex post” (Parent, 2004, p. 38). However, the bargaining process, oriented to provide the 
right incentives to overcome the possibility of underinvestment, could be a game with multiple 
equilibria. For instance, as argued by Leuven et al. 2005, “When a firm invests more in a worker’s 
skills than theory predicts, the worker may interpret this as a ‘kind’ action of the firm which 
deserves some reward. The worker can give this reward by behaving less opportunistically than 
standard theory assumes he will do. If the firm anticipates this kindness, it will be prepared to invest 
more” (p. 138).  
Only when managers perceives the threat of underinvestment and has a realistic perspective of 
potential failures, do they introduce contracts as remedies to ensure an efficient equilibrium. On the 
contrary, myopic perceptions tend to result in poorly designed agreements and suboptimal levels of 
human capital investments.  
Based on these arguments, it may be inferred that managerial quality is a central concern in on-
the-job training literature due to its strategic importance to those bargaining strategies that may 
restore an efficient level of human capital accumulation. Research on management literature, 
though not strictly focused on training, supports the relevance of quality of management and 
provides useful suggestions for our analysis. 
First, the individual attributes of managers, such as education, are important in explaining the 
quality of entrepreneurial performance. The level of education, as argued by (Lazear, 2004), is 
acknowledged to be one of the most important components of managerial abilities and human 
capital. Empirical studies reviewed by van der Sluis et al. (2008) confirm that among the many 
factors that contribute to entrepreneurial success, one important determinant is education. Indeed, 
personnel policies and management decisions, especially when many dimensions of the interaction 
between employers and workers, such as training, are left unspecified by contracts, require 
generalist skills, such as those provided by formal education, to properly address contract 
incompleteness. Furthermore, as determined by Baptista et al. (2013), skilled entrepreneurs, i.e., 
highly educated entrepreneurs, may offer employees higher pay for their skills and manage better 
performing business.  
Second, well-educated managers are likely to possess a deeper knowledge of the bundles and 
complementarities of modern management practices (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995) as related to 
rewarding workers for tasks and complex jobs that cannot be easily regulated by explicit contracts 
(Baker et al. 1994). Among these tasks, it is plausible to include those related to learning activities 
and on-the-job training. It is noted that the adoption of holistic forms of workplace organisation, 
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including incentive systems and multi-tasking, may be a central concern for training. For instance, 
as reviewed by Leuven (2005, p. 100), although firms cannot attach wages to skills, they can attach 
wages to tasks. Thus, the well-known ‘up-or-out practice’2 or the credible ‘up-or-stay promotion 
rule’ (Huberman and Kahn, 1988) may induce the gathering of non-verifiable firm-specific human 
capital. Indeed, as hypothesised by Huberman and Kahn (1988), in any given firm, there may be 
jobs that involve both easy and difficult tasks. A trained worker is assumed to be more productive 
when successfully performing more difficult tasks, while an untrained worker is more productive 
when successfully performing an easy task. If different wages can credibly be assigned to different 
jobs, a worker will invest in training if the wage increase for promotion is greater than the cost of 
the investment. However, these contractual solutions entail managerial ability. 
Third, with respect to training, many dimensions of the interactions between employers and 
workers are left unspecified by employment contracts. For such contracts, game theoretic models 
and experimental methods demonstrate the importance of fairness (Fehr and Gachter, 2000). In 
particular, firms earn a reputation by rewarding training, but workers are motivated by fairness and 
reciprocity as well as monetary payoffs. As empirically tested by Leuven et al. (2005), workers who 
exhibit a high sensitivity to reciprocity have higher training rates than workers who exhibit a low 
sensitivity to reciprocity (Leuven et al. 2005). These results conform and align with the upper 
echelon perspective that considers any economic organisation to be a reflection of the personal 
characteristics, including education, of its managers (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
Summing up, we hypothesize that the quality and education of managers may favour the 
evolution of social norms based on gift exchange and collective bonuses that enhance trust. These 
agreements promote enforcement mechanisms that induce the accumulation of firm specific skills, 
reduce separation after training, sustain collaborative relationships and motivate co-workers to train 
each other (Green and Heywood, 2011). 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1. Data  
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset obtained by merging information from two 
sources, namely, balance-sheet data from the Bureau Van Dijk AIDA archive and firm-level 
information obtained from the employer and employee surveys (RIL) conducted by the ISFOL 
(Institute for the Development of Vocational Training of Workers). The RIL data cover a 
                                                          
2
 "The up or out" rule requires that each worker in the organisation must achieve a certain rank within a 
certain period of time. If they fail to do so, they must leave the organisation. 
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representative sample of 250,000 partnerships and limited liability Italian firms that operated in 
the private non-agricultural sector. The main advantage of the RIL surveys is that they offer 
information on firms of all sizes on a national scale and for all private non-agricultural sectors, 
whereas other datasets for Italy are restricted to large companies, particular areas of the country 
or selected industries. The other advantage of the RIL surveys is their richness of information as 
it enables us to have data on the presence of firm level bargaining and the bargaining issues as 
well as firm and employee characteristics. 
With respect to the other key variables, the RIL surveys offer information on training, 
defined as the percentage of total trained employees. Furthermore, the surveys provide data on 
the presence of firm-level bargaining (FLB), on agreements on labour organisations (LO), such 
as work time, labour organisation, and union relations, and on the presence of performance-
related pay (PRP) schemes. Each firm is asked whether such a scheme has been adopted; 
therefore, our PRP variable is a dummy variable indicating whether some type of PRP scheme is 
offered
3
. Furthermore, the 2010 survey provides data on the educational levels of managers as a 
proxy for quality. We use a dummy variable that equals 1 if the manager of the firm has a 
tertiary education (post-secondary education), and 0 otherwise. The dataset we use contains 
other information on firm strategies, such as product and process innovation, internalisation, i.e., 
the presence of firms in international markets as exporters, and merger activity (for a detailed 
definition of all variables, see Appendix, Table A1). Other information includes employment 
composition by gender, employment contracts and occupation. 
We also use the Bureau Van Dijk AIDA archive that contains information on balance sheet 
data for Italian firms with a turnover of more than 100,000 Euros. Merging the two databases, 
the sample that we use is an unbalanced panel of 3736 firms for 2007 and 3810 for 2010.  
We use the merged dataset and exclude only firms with fewer than five employees. The 
threshold of five employees should guarantee that we retain only those firms characterised by 
structured personnel policies. However, in a second step, as a robustness check, we also 
performed estimates by splitting the entire sample into two sub-groups, specifically, firms with 
fewer than 15 employees and firms with 15 or more employees (see Appendix). The threshold 
of 15 workers is justified as the Italian institutional setting mandates that only firms with 15 or 
more employees must have work councils that can call general meetings and hold consultations  
regarding collective wage agreements.  
 
                                                          
3
The dataset does not provide statistics on how many workers in the firm receive PRP or whether these 
schemes are offered to all or to a selected group of employees (managers, blue- collars, or all workers).  
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3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the matched database RIL-AIDA. Our key variables are 
i) diffusion of firm level bargaining (FLB); ii) bargaining with respect to performance related pay 
(PRP), iii) bargaining regarding labour organisation (LO); iv) diffusion of training (Training). 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
From Table 1, it can be deduced that the incidence of agreements at the company level was 
modest and relatively stable over the sampled period. Indeed, only 8.9 percent and 9.4 percent of 
firms, in 2007 and 2010, respectively, engaged in FLB. The agreements on labour issues (LO), such 
as working time and labour organisation, were less frequently adopted over time, and their adoption 
declined from 3.4 percent in 2007 to only 1.6 percent in 2010. Notice, however, that bargaining on 
wage flexibility and PRP recorded a slight increase, from only 5.5 percent in 2007 to 7.8 percent in 
2010.  
Interestingly, this last change was accompanied by an increase in the proportion of trained 
employees from 19 percent in 2007 to approximately 23 percent in 2010. This suggests that 
following the beginning of the great economic crisis of 2008, Italian enterprises were characterised 
by a structural low recourse to firm level contracts and an even lower recourse on agreements on 
labour organisation; however, the Italian firms exhibited a greater propensity to adopt incentive 
wage schemes (PRP) and a greater intensity to provide training programmes for their workforces. 
We also observed a slight decline in fixed-term contracts, which dropped from approximately 8.8 
percent in 2007 to 8.1 percent in 2010. These tendencies for training and fixed-term contracts 
confirm that in Italy, as in other European countries, during the economic crisis, “firms try to 
protect the human capital embodied in skilled blue-collar and white-collar workers” (Békes et al. 
2011, p. 2) by giving priority to the retention of human capital embodied in skilled labour and by 
retraining other workers. 
Regarding other employee characteristics, we observe an invariant structure of the workforce in 
terms of gender composition and occupational categories, i.e., executives, white- and blue-collar 
workers. With respect to firm performances and strategies, the major changes observed after the 
crisis included the significant stagnation of labour productivity coupled with a lower degree of 
involvement of Italian enterprises in product and process innovation. This tendency is revealed by 
the reduced number of firms that engaged in product innovation, with a decline from 56 percent in 
2007 to 45 percent in 2010, as well as the decline in process innovation, with a reduction from 40 
percent in 2007 to 37 percent in 2010. 
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For the year 2010, our database also recorded an increasing number of mergers and acquisitions 
involving Italian enterprises. The proportion was 3.4 percent, which is approximately three times 
that recorded for 2007. Moreover, the number of firms that weathered the crisis by relying on 
international markets increased, thus revealing the importance of the extensive margin, i.e., the 
change in the number of exporting firms as a strategic response to mitigate and compensate for the 
contraction in domestic demand.  
However, the focus of this paper is to examine the differences among firms that adopt FLB, PRP 
and LO and to verify how these disparities may be related to firms’ training activities. Summary 
statistics for the complete sample, broken down by training, are presented in Table 2.  
 
Insert Table 2 
The sample distribution of enterprises by training indicates that the greatest incidences of FLB 
and PRP were found among training firms, i.e., firms that offered training to their employees. 
Indeed, in 2007, the incidence of FLB in training firms was 13 percent, which was more than 
double the incidence in non-training firms at 6 percent, and a similar difference was recorded for 
PRP, with the diffusion at 9 percent in training firms and only 4 percent in non-training firms. Note 
that all of these disparities were confirmed for 2010. 
Going beyond these descriptive statistics, we verify whether training firms demonstrated a greater 
propensity to adopt payment for results, likely with the aim to mitigate the specific agency and hold-
up problems characterising their organisation. In this context, we analyse heterogeneity in firm 
responses after the crisis, i.e., with respect to wage flexibility and training strategies, and the 
influence of managerial quality.  
 
4. Econometric strategy and results 
4.1 Econometric strategy 
 
We first explore, for the whole sample, the association among training, the adoption of FLB and 
its components, negotiations on performance-related pay (PRP) and labour organisation (LO). This 
empirical analysis is performed by estimating the following equations: 
 
(1) tiititititi XLTrainingFLB ,,,,,    t=2007,2010 
(2) tiititititi XLTrainingPRP ,,,,,    t=2007,2010 
(3) tiititititi XLTrainingLO ,,,,,    t=2007,2010 
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where Training is the share of trained employees; the vectors Lit and Xit represent workforce and 
firm characteristics, respectively; i denotes the time invariant unobserved effect; it  is the error 
term that is assumed to be independent of Lit and Xit and normally distributed, i.e. ),0( N . The 
pooled OLS estimates of Equations (1), (2) and (3) have been replicated in two samples of firms. 
The first includes firms run by managers with a tertiary level of education (High Qual.Man), and 
the second includes the group of firms run by managers with a lower degree of education (upper 
secondary education, primary and lower second education (Low Qual.Man). 
It is noted that the pooled OLS estimates may be biased because they do not take into account 
the problems of sorting firms that will typically arise if firms with FLB agreements are more likely 
to adopt training programmes and are run by management of high quality. Indeed, part of the 
differences imputed to training and quality of management could be due to unobserved factors. To 
circumvent this problem, although our time variability is limited because we have data for only two 
years (Wooldridge, 2012), we adopt the fixed effect estimator that permits us to disentangle, for the 
whole sample and the subsamples of High Qual.Man and Low Qual.Man firms, the differences 
actually attributable to the different impacts of training based on other sources of firm unobserved 
heterogeneity. By using longitudinal data, the firm-individual fixed effects that are included in the 
model control for the individual (firm) specific characteristics not captured by X, thus permitting a 
more appropriate solution to the problem of unobserved firm heterogeneity.  
 
4.2 OLS Estimates  
 
Table 3 presents the OLS pooled estimates where our key regressor, training, is a determinant of 
the adoption of firm level bargaining (column 1). Furthermore, the estimates reported in columns 2 
and 3 allow us to evaluate the presence of a composition effect, i.e., whether training influenced 
differently the bargaining issues, PRP and LO, respectively. Notice that all pooled estimates are 
obtained by including time, sector and regional (NUTS) dummies to control for time-varying, 
sector-specific factors, as well as geographical disparities that likely impact bargaining intensity and 
bargaining issues but cannot be captured by other controls included in this analysis. All other control 
variables regarding firm and employee characteristics are reported in Table 1 (for brevity, only the 
coefficients associated with the key regressors are reported). 
Insert Table 3 
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Our results provide clear evidence that a higher probability of FLB is positively associated with 
training. This link is driven primarily by the impact of training on wage premium (PRP) 
agreements, whereas we found a smaller association between training and labour organisation (LO). 
In particular, according to the OLS estimates, it may be expected that an increase of 10 percent of 
the trained employees (equivalent to a standard deviation) leads to a higher probability of PRP 
agreements of 0.1*0.052 (0.34*0.052%, where 0.34 is the standard deviation of training reported in 
the last column of Table 1). With respect to the influence of bargaining on labour matters, the 
increased probability is equal only to 0.1*0.016 (0.34*0.016 %).  
The share of female employees decreases the probability for firm-level bargaining on labour 
matters (-3.3 percent) and, with greater intensity, on PRP (-7.4 percent). These results were derived 
by controlling for typology of contracts, i.e., fixed-term or permanent contracts, and occupational 
positions, i.e., executives and white- and blue-collar workers. These findings are consistent with 
recent EU evidence and confirm that women and men are affected by different workplace practices 
and different methods of rewarding employees through PRP (EU Commission, 2013, p.5). The 
reduced ability of women to access firm level bargaining may prevent women from reaching the 
same pay levels as men and may be the cause of different actual structures of pay systems regarding 
PRP, which may result in different rates of pay for female and male employees (EU Commission, 
2013, p. 5).  
Another aspect of the workforce relevant for our analysis concerns the precarious position of 
employees. The share of fixed-term contracts is negatively and significantly associated with a lower 
adoption of PRP (-7.5 percent). In the Italian institutional setting, PRP wage premiums, which are 
paid at the second level of bargaining, are added to the base wage, which is established in the first 
level of bargaining, and could be zero when firms do not pay these premiums. Thus, the negative 
coefficient of fixed-term contracts derived from our PRP estimates signal that workers do not 
receive any wage premiums and confirm the significance of the wage penalty associated with 
temporary jobs, a finding also observed in other Italian studies (see Bosio, 2014). This finding 
suggests that temporary jobs can be associated with a wage penalty (low incidence of PRP) perhaps 
because these precarious positions are associated with a depreciation in acquired workers’ skills and 
the use of flexible contracts may lessen any wage-tenure effect” (Bosio, 2014, p. 65). The third 
component of outsiders in the Italian workforce are newly hired employees whose presence reduces 
the probability of FLB and PRP.  
Pooled OLS estimates indicate that firm size is another significant determinant of bargaining 
with respect to both PRP and LO, likely because enterprise negotiations and related transaction 
costs are expensive to implement and are, thus, more likely affordable by large firms. Labour 
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productivity, which represents the indicator of ability to pay, is positively associated only with 
concessionary bargaining and, accordingly, with payments of PRP (Boeri et. 2013). Finally, 
bargaining practices were affected by the economic crisis of 2008, as evidenced by the coefficient 
associated with the dummy variable for the year 2010, which is negative and significant in all three 
sets of estimates, namely, FLB, PRP and LO, indicating that Italian firms engaged in less intense 
bargaining activities as a reaction to the crisis. 
All of our results have been subjected to an additional robustness check by splitting the sample 
into two subsamples according to firm size, i.e., firms with 15 or more employees and firms with 
fewer than 15 employees. The choice of this threshold is motivated by the Italian institutional 
setting characterised by more stringent regulations for firms with 15 or more employees. These 
regulations concern not only different employment protection norms for dismissals but also 
mandatory rules for work councils that must be established in firms with 15 and more employees. In 
summary, the results reported in the Appendix (Tables A2 and A3) indicate that in smaller 
enterprises, the impact of training is significant only in pooled OLS estimates and that when 
unobserved heterogeneity is considered, training loses its significance. This outcome is consistent 
with other characteristics of small Italian enterprises that are characterised by dynastic management 
and, at times, by untalented management (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2013). In these firms, managerial 
styles are dominated by informal agreements and informal processes and the adoption of formal 
negotiations among employers, employees and their unionised representatives are less frequent. In 
these governance structures characterised by family capitalism, the lack of work council-type 
bodies leads to the absence of formal rights of employees to influence key managerial decisions and 
strategies. Thus, in small Italian firms, the probabilities of FLB and the implementation of a training 
strategy are limited and insignificant, as confirmed by our estimates.  
 
The managerial quality  
Our key test is whether some of the differences in the association between training and FLB, and 
its components, are related to variations in managerial quality. Following previous literature (see 
the survey of van der Sluis et al. 2008), we hypothesise that formal schooling and higher education 
levels of entrepreneurs and managers reflect their general abilities and that these abilities foster 
good personnel policies and firm success (Lazear, 2004). Accordingly, we contend that firms that 
are run by high-quality management and managers with tertiary levels of education show a greater 
propensity to adopt the best management practices, such as PRP, to reduce separation and turnover 
rates in cases of firm-specific human capital investments.  
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Our results indicate that the educational attributes of managers contribute to the differences 
across firms (see Table 4). The association of training and the adoption of FLB is higher in High 
Qual.Man firms (8.1 percent) compared to the other firms (5.3 percent). Furthermore, a significant 
disparity is found with respect to the PRP component as the estimated coefficient is 6.9 percent for 
High Qual.Man firms and 4.3 percent for Low Qual.Man firms. Moreover, the comparison of the 
two groups indicates that the impact of training on bargaining on the labour organisation (LO) is 
lower and insignificant in Low Qual.Man firms.  
Insert Table 4 
 
However, as some of the differences we found could be due to unobserved factors, we use fixed 
effect estimates to circumvent the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
4.3 Fixed Effects Estimates  
 
Some of the differences we found with previous estimates could be due to unobserved 
factors, such as characteristics of firms not strictly attributable to training and managerial 
quality, our key variables, but rather to other firm attributes for which we do not control. We 
take this issue into account by using fixed effect estimates (FE) and the results obtained using 
the estimators are presented in Table 5.  
 
Insert Table 5 
 
When comparing the OLS and fixed effect estimates (Tables 3 and 5, respectively), we find 
that all of our previous results hold and, in fact, are now even more significant. The fixed 
effect estimates with respect to the whole sample regarding the impact of training on the FLB 
are lower than the OLS estimates, i.e., 3.6 percent and 6.3 percent, respectively. A similar 
difference is found in the PRP regression as the training coefficient obtained from the OLS  is 
5.2, whereas the fixed effect estimate is 3.3. Furthermore, the influence of bargaining on the 
labour organisation (LO) based on fixed effect estimates reduces both in magnitude and 
significance. However, the divide between firms run by high and low managerial quality is 
even more obvious when we adopt fixed effects estimates. For firms run by high-quality 
managers we have additional confirmation that the associations between training and our 
dependent variables, especially FLB and PRP, were not driven by unobserved characteristics 
of Italian firms. For this group of firms, the fixed effect estimates indicate that the role of 
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training is even higher than that obtained with pooled OLS estimates. (In fixed effects 
estimates the coefficients for FLB and PRP are 0,089 and 0,0076, whereas the OLS estimates 
are, respectively, 0.081 and 0.069). Only the coefficient associated with bargaining in labour 
organisations (LO) loses significance. It is evident that in Low Qual.Man firms, only 
unobserved characteristics motivate the positive role of training, according to our dependent 
variables. Therefore, by correcting for unobserved firm individual heterogeneity in firms led 
by low quality management, the influence of training evaporates. On the contrary, for those 
firms led by high-quality management, opposite results are obtained. Accordingly, 
management quality may be behind the adoption of wage bonuses that are offered to obtain 
reciprocal behaviour and loyalty as well as to prevent the failure to accumulate firm specific 
skills. These types of agreements, which may well discourage separation and reduce turnover 
rates, may also represent a contractual solution to the failure to provide adequate firm-financed 
training. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Previous research has provided evidence that business performance is conditioned by manager 
attributes and that the education of managers is a good predictor of business success (Maes et al. 
2012). This paper contributes to previous research by disclosing the impact of managerial quality in 
on-the-job training. Training represents a typical management scenario as it features inherent 
incompleteness and a relational nature similar to that of many other employment contracts, and as 
such, it brings to the forefront the determinant role of manager attributes in shaping strategic 
interactions between employers and employees. Accordingly, this paper shows that educated 
managers more clearly perceive that increasing expected returns on human capital investments 
require the adoption of firm level agreements, such as those regarding performance-related pay.  
The introduction of the role of managerial quality is consistent with the original fixed effects 
panel data model that was designed to control for this unmeasured managerial capability (Mundlak, 
1961). By introducing education as a signal of the quality of the entrepreneurs and managers, we 
proxied and quantified the effect of this unmeasurable input. Interestingly, the fixed effect 
correction we adopt reveals even clearer evidence that training in firms run by qualified managers is 
a key driver of agreements regarding pay for performance schemes. The propensity of highly 
educated managers to use PRP bonuses reveals a commitment strategy that favours reciprocity in 
the workplace and minimises opportunistic behaviours. Moreover, these wage agreements represent 
a signal of loyalty that is transmitted from management to employees, and as such, it may well 
mitigate the problem of suboptimal investments in human capital. These agreements, based on gift 
15 
 
exchange and payment of collective bonuses, reveal enforcement mechanisms that induce the 
accumulation of firm specific skills, reduce separation after training, and sustain collaborative 
relationships that may motivate co-workers to provide training to their colleagues (Green and 
Heywood, 2011). 
This paper represents an attempt to conjoin different areas of research that, to date, have not been 
strictly integrated, namely, studies on training, performance-related pay and management quality. 
Further and deeper research to integrate these fields may represent promising avenues for future 
research. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Year 2007 Year  2010 
Years 2007-
2010 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Firm level bargaining 
      FLB 0.089 0.284 0.094 0.292 0.091 0.288 
PRP 0.055 0.228 0.078 0.269 0.068 0.251 
LB 0.034 0.181 0.016 0.125 0.024 0.154 
Workforce 
characteristics       
% trained 0.189 0.326 0.231 0.351 0.212 0.340 
% new hires 0.134 0.163 0.090 0.153 0.111 0.159 
% fixed term contracts 0.088 0.147 0.081 0.131 0.084 0.139 
% executives 0.036 0.080 0.043 0.088 0.040 0.085 
% white collars 0.394 0.303 0.394 0.297 0.394 0.300 
% blue collars 0.570 0.317 0.563 0.316 0.566 0.316 
% females 0.324 0.258 0.338 0.259 0.332 0.258 
Firm characteristics 
      
M&A 0.013 0.114 0.034 0.181 0.024 0.154 
product innovation 0.558 0.497 0.448 0.497 0.499 0.500 
process innovation 0.402 0.490 0.370 0.483 0.385 0.487 
exporters 0.209 0.406 0.366 0.482 0.293 0.455 
ln(labour productivity) 10.788 0.524 10.775 0.533 10.781 0.529 
ln (physical capital per 
empl.) 
9.670 1.479 10.073 1.724 9.886 1.627 
       N. of obs. 3736 3810 7546 
Source: RIL-AIDA data. Note: descriptive statistics with sampling weighs 
 
Table 2: Training and non training firms 
 
Year 2007 Year 2010 
 
N. 
firms 
FLB PRP   LB  
N. 
firms  
FLB PRP LB  
         Non-training firms 2086 0.06 0.04 0.03 1926 0.06 0.05 0.01 
Training firms 1650 0.13 0.09 0.05 1884 0.14 0.11 0.03 
 
  
   
  
   
N. of obs. 3736 0.09 0.06 0.03 3810 0.09 0.08 0.02 
Note:  RIL-AIDA. descriptive statistics with sample weights. 
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Table 3: OLS estimates 
 
FLB PRP LB 
 
[1] [2] [3] 
    % trained 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.016** 
 
[0.012] [0.01] [0.007] 
% new hires -0.045** -0.043** -0.008 
 
[0.022] [0.02] [0.012] 
% fixed term contracts -0.102*** -0.075*** -0.034** 
 
[0.026] [0.023] [0.014] 
% females -0.097*** -0.074*** -0.033*** 
 
[0.017] [0.015] [0.01] 
ln(labour productivity) 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.006 
 
[0.008] [0.007] [0.004] 
14<n of employees <50 0.094*** 0.072*** 0.023*** 
 
[0.008] [0.007] [0.005] 
49<n of employees<250 0.310*** 0.256*** 0.079*** 
 
[0.013] [0.012] [0.01] 
n of employees>249 0.618*** 0.530*** 0.223*** 
 
[0.031] [0.033] [0.045] 
year 2010 -0.013* 0.012* -0.027*** 
 
[0.008] [0.007] [0.005] 
Macro-region Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Yes Yes Yes 
constant -0.158* -0.185** 0.015 
 
[0.093] [0.082] [0.051] 
    F(.) 58.25 43.28 6.13 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.201 0.186 0.046 
N. of Obs.  7546 7533 6625 
Source. RIL-AIDA data. Note: Other controls: executives, blue 
collars, white collars, product innovation, process innovation, 
exporters, ln(physical capital per empl.), mergers&acquisitions.  
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4. OLS estimates by managers' education 
 
 
High Qual.Man Low Qual.Man 
 
FLB PRP LO FLB PRP LO 
       % trained 0.081*** 0.069*** 0.024* 0.053*** 0.043*** 0.012 
 
[0.021] [0.020] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.008] 
% new hires -0.041 -0.009 -0.032 -0.035 -0.044** 0.001 
 
[0.046] [0.042] [0.024] [0.026] [0.022] [0.015] 
% fixed term 
contracts 
-0.153*** -0.147*** -0.02 -0.085*** -0.052** -0.038**  
 
[0.054] [0.048] [0.030] [0.029] [0.025] [0.015] 
% females -0.182*** -0.129*** -0.075*** -0.048** -0.039** -0.013 
 
[0.032] [0.030] [0.019] [0.019] [0.016] [0.013] 
ln(labour 
productivity) 
0.015 0.009 0.007 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.005 
 
[0.014] [0.012] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.005] 
14<n of employees 
<50 
0.111*** 0.085*** 0.027*** 0.078*** 0.059*** 0.020*** 
 
[0.015] [0.013] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.005] 
49<n of 
employees<250 
0.353*** 0.308*** 0.077*** 0.257*** 0.199*** 0.078*** 
 
[0.021] [0.020] [0.016] [0.017] [0.015] [0.012] 
n of employees>249 0.634*** 0.547*** 0.266*** 0.523*** 0.457*** 0.148*** 
 
[0.041] [0.045] [0.073] [0.048] [0.050] [0.053] 
year 2010 -0.006 0.019 -0.028*** -0.015* 0.011 -0.026*** 
 
[0.015] [0.014] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.006] 
Macro-region  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
constant 0.044 0.012 0.047 -0.234** -0.258*** 0.01 
 
[0.169] [0.152] [0.099] [0.105] [0.092] [0.058] 
       Adj. R2 0.261 0.243 0.055 0.143 0.129 0.035 
N of obs. 2465 2456 2009 5029 5025 4571 
       Source. RIL-AIDA data. Note: Other controls: executives, blue collars, white collars, product 
innovation, process innovation, exporters, ln(physical capital per empl.), mergers&acquisitions.  
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
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Table 5: Panel fixed effect (within) estimates 
 
FLB PRP LB 
 
[1] [2] [3] 
    % trained 0.036** 0.033*** 0.007 
 
[0.014] [0.013] [0.01] 
% new hires -0.024 -0.029 0.002 
 
[0.035] [0.031] [0.024] 
% fixed term contracts -0.017 -0.015 -0.015 
 
[0.044] [0.04] [0.030] 
% females -0.017 -0.007 -0.039 
 
[0.059] [0.053] [0.040] 
ln(labour productivity) 0.024* 0.024* 0.009 
 
[0.015] [0.013] [0.010] 
14<n of employees <50 0.012 0.02 -0.008 
 
[0.019] [0.017] [0.013] 
49<n of employees<250 0.001 0.007 -0.018 
 
[0.035] [0.031] [0.025] 
n of employees>249 0.074 0.018 0.202*** 
 
[0.069 [0.062 [0.075 
year 2010 0.000 0.024*** -0.016*** 
 
[0.007] [0.006] [0.005] 
Macro-region  Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Yes Yes Yes 
constant 0.029 -0.04 0.04 
 
[0.218 [0.195 [0.151 
    N of Obs. 7546 7533 6625 
Source. RIL-AIDA data. Note: Other controls: executives, 
blue collars, white collars, product innovation, process 
innovation, exporters, ln(physical capital per empl.), 
mergers&acquisitions.  Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Fixed-effects  (within) estimates  by managers' education 
 
High Qual.Man  Low Qual.Man 
 
FLB PRP LO FLB PRP LO 
       % trained 0.089*** 0.076*** 0.019 0.01 0.012 0.001 
 
[0.026] [0.025] [0.019] [0.017] [0.015] [0.012] 
% new hires -0.047 -0.057 0.003 -0.014 -0.015 -0.002 
 
[0.069] [0.066] [0.048] [0.040] [0.035] [0.028] 
% fixed term contracts -0.101 -0.115 -0.005 -0.005 0.008 -0.022 
 
[0.090] [0.086] [0.059] [0.050] [0.043] [0.035] 
% female -0.149 -0.122 -0.062 0.036 0.052 -0.036 
 
[0.104] [0.099] [0.067] [0.073] [0.063] [0.050] 
ln(labour productivity) 0.027 0.019 0.005 0.026 0.030* 0.011 
 
[0.026] [0.025] [0.019] [0.018] [0.016] [0.013] 
14<n of employees <50 -0.022 0.004 -0.031 0.029 0.031* 0.001 
 
[0.037 [0.035] [0.024] [0.022] [0.019] [0.015] 
49<n of employees<250 -0.131** -0.023 -0.125*** 0.078* 0.019 0.054*   
 
[0.060] [0.058] [0.041] [0.043] [0.037] [0.032] 
n of employees>249 -0.089 -0.127 0.344** 0.196** 0.146* 0.200**  
 
[0.112] [0.107] [0.161] [0.089] [0.077] [0.085] 
year 2010 0.012 0.037*** -0.019** -0.005 0.021*** -0.016*** 
 
[0.013] [0.012] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] 
Macro-region  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
constant 0.462 0.359 0.186 -0.066 -0.264 0.121 
 
[0.327] [0.312] [0.231] [0.308] [0.266] [0.207] 
 
      
 
      
N. of Obs. 2465 2456 2009 5029 5025 4571 
       Source. RIL-AIDA data. Note: Other controls: executives, blue collars, white collars, product innovations, 
process innovations, exporters, ln(physical capital per empl.), mergers&acquisitions.  Statistical significance: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX  
Table A1: Data descriptions 
 
 Variable Definition 
FLB 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts 
firm level bargaining, 0 otherwise 
PRP 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts 
PRP payments of any kind, 0 otherwise. 
LO 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts 
bargaining on labour organization of any kind, 0 
otherwise. 
ln (labour product.) 
Log of value-added per employee (source AIDA) 
deflated by the value added deflator (source ISTAT) 
 
 
ln (capital per empl. ) 
Log of capital stock per employee (source AIDA) 
deflated by the investment deflator (source ISTAT) 
Employees category:  
High Qual.Man Managers with tertiary level of education 
Low Qual.Man 
Managers with a lower degree of education (upper 
secondary education, primary and lower second education) 
   Executives Percentage of managers and supervisors 
   White collar workers Percentage of white collar workers 
   Blue-collar workers Percentage of manual workers  
Females Percentage of women among total workers 
Fixed-term contracts Percentage of fixed-term workers 
Hiring  Percentage of hired workers 
Process Innovation 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopted 
process innovations in the 3 previous years, 0 
otherwise 
Product Innovation 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm originated 
new products in the 3 previous years, 0 otherwise 
Exporters 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm exported 
in the last three years, 0 otherwise 
M&As 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm  experienced  merger 
or acquisition in the 3 previous years, 0 otherwise 
Macro area  
Localization in i) North-Western regions, ii) North Eastern 
regions; iii) Central regions; iv)  Southern regions 
Sectors 
Dummy variable for sectors that equals 1 if the firm 
is localized in sector shown in table1, 0 otherwise 
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Table A2: Pooled OLS estimates by firms' size 
 
 n of employees <15 n of employees>14 
 
FLB PRP LO FLB PRP LO 
       % trained 0.040*** 0.026*** 0.014* 0.101*** 0.088*** 0.022*   
 
[0.012] [0.01] [0.008] [0.019] [0.017] [0.012] 
% new hires -0.028 -0.018 -0.011 -0.009 -0.02 0.003 
 
[0.019] [0.015] [0.011] [0.042] [0.038] [0.023] 
% fixed term 
contracts 
0.027 0.028 0.002 -0.191*** -0.138*** -0.060*** 
 
[0.028] [0.023] [0.017] [0.041] [0.037] [0.023] 
% female -0.018 -0.015 -0.001 -0.160*** -0.119*** -0.060*** 
 
[0.016 [0.012 [0.011 [0.028 [0.025 [0.018 
ln(labour 
productivity) 
0.019** 0.018*** 0.002 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.011 
 
[0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.014] [0.013] [0.007] 
year 2010 0.000 0.012** -0.010** -0.029** 0.007 -0.041*** 
 
[0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.013] [0.012] [0.008] 
Macro-region  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
constant -0.208** -0.187** -0.026 0.085 0.022 0.094 
 
[0.097] [0.079] [0.06] [0.174] [0.159] [0.085] 
       F(.) 2.14 1.94 1.55 20.16 19.11 4.000 
Prob > F 0.002 0.005 0.0492 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.021 0.02 0.008 0.081 0.083 0.0246 
 N. of Obs. 3082 3085 3005 4464 4448 3620 
Source. RIL-AIDA data. Note: Other controls: executives, blue collars, white collars, product 
innovations, process innovations, exporters, ln(physical capital per empl.), mergers&acquisitions.  
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A3: Panel fixed effect (whitin) estimates by firms size 
 
 n of employees <15 n of employees>14 
 
FLB PRP LO FLB PRP LO 
       % trained 0.027 0.012 0.012 0.037 0.044** 0.002 
 
[0.017] [0.014] [0.011] [0.023] [0.022] [0.018] 
% new hires -0.079** -0.075** -0.008 0.005 0.016 -0.026 
 
[0.038] [0.031] [0.025] [0.064] [0.06] [0.048] 
% fixed term 
contracts 
-0.014 0.009 -0.021 -0.051 -0.049 -0.024 
 
[0.047] [0.038] [0.03] [0.086] [0.08] [0.063] 
% female 0.005 -0.03 0.037 -0.052 -0.01 -0.126 
 
[0.061*] [0.049] [0.038] [0.118] [0.110] [0.087] 
ln(labour 
productivity) 
0.034** 0.028** 0.012 0.047* 0.04 0.02 
 
[0.016 [0.013] [0.011] [0.027] [0.025] [0.023] 
year 2010 0.002 0.01 -0.005 -0.003 0.036*** -0.029*** 
 
[0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] 
Macro-region  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
constant -0.246 -0.288* -0.046 0.024 -0.038 0.093 
 
[0.208] [0.168] [0.134] [0.406] [0.378] [0.322] 
 
      
F(.) 1.04 1.54 0.79 1.18 1.34 2.15 
Prob > F 0.406 0.057 0.740 0.2577 0.135 0.002 
N.of Obs. 3082 3085 3005 4464 4448 3620 
Source. RIL-AIDA data. Note: Other controls: executives, blue collars, white collars, 
product innovations, process innovations, exporters, ln(physical capital per empl), 
mergers&acquisitions.  Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
